Ghana's proposed reform for electing Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) faces significant criticism. Experts warn that the government's current plan for candidate nomination could allow partisan influence, undermining the reform's stated non-partisan goal. This raises concerns about potential one-party dominance in local governance across the country's 261 districts.
The Constitutional Review Committee (CRC), chaired by Professor H. Kwasi Prempeh, initially recommended amending Article 243. This amendment would enable direct, non-partisan election of MMDCEs, phased in by an independent Devolution Commission. Cabinet approved the broad concept, with a bill expected in Parliament by year-end. However, the government's proposed implementation differs significantly from the CRC's original vision.
This reform is crucial for Ghana's decentralisation efforts and local accountability. For 30 years, MMDCEs have been presidential appointees, answering primarily to the executive. Public sentiment strongly supports direct elections; an Institute of Economic Affairs survey found close to 7 in 10 Ghanaians in favour. This widespread consensus on the need for elected MMDCEs highlights the importance of a truly independent process.
Professor Prempeh, the committee's chair, has publicly stated that the government's position has "thrown a spanner in the works." Political commentator John Darko questioned why the government should select three candidates for voters. Martin Adjei-Mensah Korsah, a former Local Government Minister, argues the proposed arrangement is functionally identical to the current appointment system. These criticisms highlight a fundamental disagreement over the 'how' of non-partisan elections.
The government's proposal involves political authorities nominating five candidates, from whom three would be shortlisted for the ballot. Voters would then choose one of these three in a supposedly non-partisan contest. Critics argue that if the nomination and shortlisting process is controlled by government or party-aligned structures, the final ballot will already be curated by partisan interests. This effectively allows the ruling party to control who can stand for election.
This mechanism creates a risk of incumbency and state resources influencing local elections. A ruling party could quietly decide who runs in all 261 districts, presenting it as grassroots democracy. This would allow a party to dominate local government without abolishing elections. The MMDCE position is vital for allocating development projects, managing contractor relationships, and maintaining party structures between elections.
The CRC's original recommendation included an independent Devolution Commission. This commission would have determined the sequence, criteria, and readiness for district elections, acting as a structural safeguard. The government's proposed five-nominate-three-shortlist model, run through political authorities, replaces this independent architecture. This effectively keeps the popular headline of the reform while removing the crucial element designed to ensure its integrity.
To ensure genuine reform, three key aspects require scrutiny. First, the nominating body must be genuinely insulated from the ruling party. Second, the process must be transparent, allowing excluded candidates to publicly challenge their removal. Third, the phased rollout must be based on genuine readiness, not political convenience. Without these safeguards, the reform risks becoming a cosmetic change, rather than a substantive improvement in local governance.