Ghana's central bank, the Bank of Ghana (BoG), incurred an estimated GHS 22 billion loss in 2025 from its Domestic Gold Purchase Programme. This significant financial setback occurred despite the country achieving record gold exports of US$21 billion in the same year.
The loss, highlighted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the BoG's own accounts, adds considerable pressure to the central bank's already strained balance sheet. The Domestic Gold Purchase Programme, also known as Gold-for-Reserves, aimed to build up Ghana's international reserves. However, the financing costs and market exposures led to substantial losses for the BoG.
This situation unfolds against a backdrop of Ghana experiencing one of its best gold years, with exports pushing total export earnings to an all-time high. Gross international reserves also rose significantly, from US$9.1 billion to between US$11.9 billion and US$13.8 billion. Yet, the BoG simultaneously reported a net loss of GHS 15.6 billion for 2025, closing the year with negative equity approaching GHS 94-96 billion. This paradox of national gold wealth alongside central bank losses raises serious questions about public finance management and institutional accountability.
The Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod), established in 2025, plays a central role in this discussion. GoldBod replaced the Precious Minerals Marketing Company, becoming the sole authority for buying, assaying, grading, and exporting gold from the artisanal and small-scale mining sector. Its mandate was to formalize the market, curb smuggling, and channel more gold into official reserves. GoldBod's Chief Executive Officer, Sammy Gyamfi, maintains that GoldBod itself recorded a trading profit of GHS 907 million and a total surplus of GHS 5.4 billion in 2025. He argues the GHS 22 billion loss sits on the Bank of Ghana's books, not GoldBod's.
Parliament's Minority Caucus, led by Alexander Afenyo-Markin, disputes this distinction. They argue that regardless of which institution's ledger records the loss, the funds involved are public money. The caucus insists on a full account of the programme, which GoldBod helped implement. Both sides have called for Ghana's independent Auditor-General to investigate the matter, seeking clarity beyond public statements. This reflects a sensible approach to resolving the complex financial dispute.
The implications of these losses are far-reaching for Ghana's economic stability and public trust. While a central bank cannot go bankrupt like a commercial bank, large and opaque losses can erode confidence in its ability to protect the cedi's value. The BoG's balance sheet was already under severe strain from impairment losses due to the Domestic Debt Exchange Programme. The gold purchase losses compound these existing vulnerabilities. Future actions will likely focus on strengthening governance, improving transparency in public financial operations, and refining gold purchasing strategies to prevent similar losses. Policymakers and financial markets will closely monitor the Auditor-General's findings and any subsequent reforms to ensure fiscal prudence and maintain investor confidence in Ghana's economy.